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TAGS: [PREL](#) [PHUM](#) [KUNR](#) [IR](#) [BM](#) [AF](#) [KS](#) [SU](#)
SUBJECT: U.S. AND JAPAN DISCUSS IRAN, EAST TIMOR, BURMA,
SUDAN, AFGHANISTAN, AND UN REFORM

Classified By: Ambassador Alejandro D. Wolff,
per 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) Summary. During a regular U.S.-Japan bilateral meeting on February 8, Amb Khalilzad and Japanese PermRep Takasu discussed Iran, Burma, Afghanistan, DPRK, and a range of other issues (UN Reform discussion covered septel). On Iran, Takasu reiterated Japanese support for the draft UNSCR, but emphasized the importance of a unanimous Security Council vote. He said Japan had approached Vietnam and Indonesia to lobby for their support. Takasu agreed that the international community seemed to be losing momentum in Burma, and argued that China should play a more constructive role. He agreed that the Friends Group on Burma should meet before Gambari's next trip. On Afghanistan, the two sides agreed that someone must be appointed SRSG as soon as possible. Takasu said Japan wants to be involved in the upcoming review of UNAMA's mandate. On North Korea, Takasu lamented the lack of progress in the Six-Party Talks, and suggested the U.S. was partly to blame for appearing "too flexible" in response to DPRK duplicity last year. He argued for a reconsideration of the Six-Party process and urged greater U.S.-Japan-South Korea coordination on DPRK issues. The two Ambassadors also discussed East Timor, Ethiopia-Eritrea, the Peacebuilding Commission, and Japan's plans for an African development summit. End Summary.

Iran

¶2. (C) Amb Khalilzad reported that some of the elected UNSC members (E10) want to wait until the next IAEA report is released, sometime between Feb 15-25, to proceed with the next Iran sanctions UNSCR. South Africa, Libya, Indonesia, and possibly Vietnam had questions about the draft UNSCR, particularly with regard to its provisions about inspection of cargo, and Libya appeared to be hardening its position on sanctions in general. Amb Khalilzad emphasized that although UNSC unanimity is important, we do not see any link between the IAEA report and the UNSCR, and may have to push the resolution to a vote even if certain countries abstain. Takasu reiterated Japan's support for the UNSCR as part of a dual-track strategy with Iran and emphasized the importance of E10 unanimity on the resolution. He noted that Japan had approached Vietnam and Indonesia to urge them to vote in favor of the resolution.

Burma

¶3. (C) Amb Khalilzad noted that the U.S. and Japan share the same goals and have experienced the same frustrations in Burma. The Burmese must cooperate with UN envoy Gambari, he said, and the SYG should play a useful role in this process

-- including by engaging China and India and by speaking out publicly about inadequate Burmese cooperation with Gambari. Noting that the U.S. had just imposed additional bilateral sanctions on Burma, Amb Khalilzad observed that the UNSC needed to at least increase pressure incrementally on the Burmese regime.

¶4. (C) Takasu agreed that the international community seemed to be losing momentum in Burma. He said Japan had urged the Burmese Foreign Minister, who had recently visited Tokyo, in the "strongest language" that Burma must accept a visit from Gambari in mid-April. Noting that Gambari would visit China from February 18-19, and possibly Singapore next, Takasu argued that the PRC should play a more constructive role with regard to Burma at the highest levels. He argued that the SYG should speak out about Burma's non-cooperation before the international community gives any thought to sanctions. After initially expressing skepticism about a meeting of the Friends Group, Takasu later agreed that the Friends should meet before Gambari goes to China. He emphasized that Burma should not/not be invited to attend this meeting, as some members of the Friends Group had reportedly suggested.

Afghanistan

¶5. (C) Amb Khalilzad emphasized that a new Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) in Afghanistan must be identified as soon as possible. Turning to the renewal of the UNAMA mandate in March 2008, Amb Khalilzad said the mandate may need a review, similar to the work that was done on the UNAMI (Iraq) mandate. This process should build on the recent Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB) meeting held in Tokyo.

¶6. (C) Takasu agreed that the new SRSG should be appointed as soon as possible and opined that the candidate should come from a NATO country. He suggested that Kai Eide would be interested if the Norwegian official thought the U.S. backed his candidacy. Takasu affirmed that Japan would want to be involved in the process of reviewing UNAMA's mandate, and in this context, recalled two main conclusions from the Tokyo JCMB meeting: first, that UNAMA has weak leadership and no strategy, and second, that Afghan Ministers have become very nationalistic. Amb Khalilzad and Takasu also discussed an idea, proposed by Brahimi, that key international donors and President Karzai or his staff should meet to exchange frank views about the problems they see in sustaining an effective international-Afghan partnership. Such a meeting could help the two sides get beyond the usual complaints and focus on working together.

North Korea

¶7. (C) Although Takasu said the Six-Party Talks were important, he warned that the process appeared to be entering stalemate. Speaking frankly, Takasu wondered if the North Koreans interpreted U.S. flexibility to secure a deal as a license to "cheat" and not suffer any consequences. He speculated that the DPRK may want to wait for a new U.S. Administration before trying to "sell" the commitments it had already undertaken but failed to satisfy. Takasu noted there had been no comprehensive declaration of the DPRK's nuclear programs, and that the disablement process had proceeded very slowly. He also said there had been "no change" in the abductee issue and "not much" improvement in DPRK-Japan relations. Takasu reported that Japanese PM Fukuda would attend the new South Korean President's inauguration, in light of the new South Korean desire to enhance its relationship with Japan, and he urged greater coordination between the U.S., Japan, and South Korea on policy towards the DPRK.

Sudan

¶8. (C) Reviewing the slow rate of UNAMID deployment, Amb

Khalilzad said that Sudanese President Bashir appeared to be dragging his feet at every turn and attempting to renegotiate the deal with the UN. Although there is still no Status of Forces Agreement, Amb Khalilzad said he expects it to be completed by February 10. There is also an issue of the sequencing of troop contributor deployments. Bashir reportedly told the SYG that he would accept the Nigerian and Rwandan contingents and then the Nepalese and Thais. Separately, the Ethiopians had offered helicopters, but the Sudanese had asked why attack helicopters had been included in the mix. Amb Khalilzad also noted that the ongoing dispute between Sudan and Chad also threatened to complicate the Darfur issue, and that the credibility of the peace process and the UNSC was at stake. Takasu agreed and asked if Libya was helping Sudan foment instability in Chad. Amb Khalilzad said we had not seen evidence of Libyan involvement but were certain that Sudan was behind the rebels in Chad.

East Timor

19. (SBU) Takasu argued that the mandate of the UN mission in East Timor should be extended. Amb Khalilzad agreed that the UN must not leave East Timor prematurely but added that the UN should be wary of creating a culture of dependency in which countries come to rely on UN missions rather than making the hard choices needed to consolidate post-conflict peace.

Ethiopia-Eritrea

110. (C) Amb Khalilzad reported that the P-5 had failed to agree on a joint warning to Eritrea to cooperate with UNMEE because China had insisted on conducting its discussions with Asmara bilaterally. Noting indications that Eritrea appeared to want war with Ethiopia, Amb Khalilzad said the SYG ought to be cautious in terms of cooperating with the Eritreans.

Africa Development Summit

111. (SBU) Takasu reported that Japan would host its first conference on African development from May 13-14 in Yokohama. This event would be repeated every five years. Takasu said Yokohama would not/not be a pledging conference, but instead focus on the three pillars needed for successful development strategy in Africa: vibrant economic growth, consolidation of peace through good governance and the rule of law, and

sustainable environmental policies. Japan envisioned a declaration resulting from the Yokohama summit, which would be drafted in the course of two or three preparatory meetings in Africa.

Peacebuilding Commission

112. (SBU) Recalling that the Japanese PM Fukuda had recently committed Japan to being a "peace-fostering nation," Takasu argued that the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) could be a useful advisory body to the UNSC. Although he admitted that the PBC had in the past not chosen "strategically important" countries, certain PBC countries like Guinea-Bissau had become main transit points for international drug shipments, which increased their strategic relevance. Noting that Japan had recently opened a bilateral aid office in Guinea-Bissau, Takasu urged the USG to focus more of its attention on the PBC. Amb Khalilzad agreed the PBC had potential and that attention to peacebuilding could help reduce the length of time for which peacekeeping operations are needed. But he expressed concern that the PBC could simply be another effort to extract additional aid money without improving coordination of existing UN efforts.

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